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Abstract
The paper provides a set of preliminary hypotheses and exploratory econometric testing
to explain low rates of participation in reformed social security systems, with special
emphasis on two Latin American countries. The hypotheses claim that the working poor
and  self-employed continue  to  have  a  specific  and  strong  rationale  for  avoiding
participation in the multi-pillar pension system and that transactions costs, system design
issues, and problems of credibility negatively influence the decision of all members of the
labor force to participate.  Some of the established hypotheses have been subjected to
exploratory econometric testing using available household survey data for Chile and
Argentina.  The results support the conjecture that socioeconomic characteristics matter
for (non) participation, and that the poor, the uneducated and the self-employed pose a
special challenge to the extension of pensions coverage.  The paper outlines a research
strategy, including a more social security-focussed survey and comparative analyses, to
confirm the results presented in this paper, and to test those hypotheses related to the
different pensions institutions reforming governments hav,e  chosen to put in place.  Work
in this vein has already begun.
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I.  Introduction and Overviewl
Of the world's 6 billion people in 1999, only 15 percent or less have access to a
formal system of retirement income support.  To the extent that households can rely on
traditional arrangements and alternative investments in retirement security, there may be
little  cause  for  worry.  However, with  the  aging of  populations,  urbanization and
globalization, the elderly will have reduced access to informal, traditional safety nets in
the family or community.  Economic development may not be fast and comprehensive
enough  for  individuals to  accumulate sufficient real  and  financial assets  over  their
working lives, rendering them increasingly vulnerable to the risk of poverty in old age.
This danger ties the concern with low rates of coverage closely to the World Bank's
mission of eradicating poverty.  For this reason the Bank has proposed a multi-pillar
pension system to provide adequate pensions for the working population and to cushion
against economic, demographic and political risks to income.  support in retirement. Many
countries in the world have started or are contemplating a move toward a multi-pillar
pension system, but evidence so far suggest that such a move has done little to increase
coverage of  the workforce  and perhaps  may have  even contributed to  a  decline in
coverage in some countries.
The alternatives to a contributory, mandated scheme of old-age income support
are non-contributory schemes in the form of demogrants, social pensions, and universal
or specially targeted social assistance. While universal and non-means tested benefits are
effective in addressing old-age poverty, they are often expensive and inefficient. Means-
tested  benefits  are  potentially  efficient  but  difficult  to  administer  to  be  effective.
Working  through  community support  and  non-government organizations presents  a
potential  alternative to  reach  the  elderly  poor,  but  there  is  little  evidence  of  the
effectiveness and long-term sustainability of relying on organized civil  society.  The
viability of  non-contributory systems of  income  support for the  elderly poor  in  an
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environment of  scarce  public  resources  and  low  administrative capacity  is  being
2 examined in a different project.
The  limited  coverage  of  contributory,  multi-pillar pension  systems  and  the
difficulties of providing effective and efficient income support for the elderly through
non-contributory schemes calls for an investigation of the relative merits and economic
trade-offs of each.  The investigation requires a better understanding of the constraints to
broader coverage under a multi-pillar scheme.  Such a scheme ideally consists of (i) a
publicly managed, unfunded, and  defined benefit pillar, which  is tax or  contribution
financed and should take care of poverty and redistributive concerns; (ii) a privately
managed, fully funded, and defined  contribution pillar, which  takes care  of  income
replacement and  is financed by  earnings-related contributions - both  (i) and  (ii) are
mandatory - and  (iii) voluntary saving for  old-age in the  form  of assets, insurance
contracts, housing, etc.  However, since pension reforms mostly start from the existing
systems and are constrained by national preferences, the economic environment, and the
costs of transition, the resulting pillars are of varying size and structure (Holzmann 1999;
Schwarz 1999). Yet, even an ideal multi-pillar structure may not be able to attract all
individuals in  the  labor force.  International evidence hints  to  a  strong correlation
between the level of coverage under a formal pension system and the income level of an
economy (see Figure 1).  This correlation suggests that administrative and other efforts
to achieve complete coverage may come at a price for individuals and the economy.
2 Poverty and the Elderly: Investigations into the effectiveness and efficiency of non-contributory schemes
for old-age, World Bank project, under preparation.
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The objective of this  paper is to  discuss the  governmental, institutional and
market-oriented  failures that deter rational individuals and households from participating
in reformed multi-pillar pension systems.  To this end, the structure of the paper is as
follows: Section II outlines briefly why coverage extension may be beneficial beyond
providing old-age income support, identifies the main barriers, and highlights drawbacks
of aggressively expanding coverage in contributory pension systems.  Section III reviews
the coverage experience in reformed schemes, with illustrative focus on Chile (which has
the longest experience with a funded pillar of individual accounts since its  reform in
1981) and Argentina (whose adoption of a "mixed" model in 1994 presents its own set of
implications for  coverage).  In  Section IV  the main  hypotheses on  the barriers to
coverage and  obstacles to  extending  access to  the  multi-pillar  pension  system are
organized in five groups: (i) the case of the poor, (ii) the case of the self-employed,  (iii)
transactions costs, (iv)  system design issues, and (v)  system credibility.  Section V
presents very preliminary econometric evidence on  some of the hypotheses based on
existing data from Chile and Argentina, while Section VI outlines ongoing and future
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research projects and efforts to  collect the necessary data to  test all  the hypotheses.
Section VII concludes.
II. The Broader Benefits, Barriers and Drawbacks to Extending Coverage
The benefits and barriers to increased coverage extend beyond the pension system
and income security in  old age.  The benefits are largely attributed to the expected
formalization of the work relationship in a world of increasing risk and waning reliance
on strained traditional systems of social security, brought on by aging, urbanization and
globalization. Barriers to greater coverage are presented by a wide range of failures by
government and  market institutions.  For this reason an improvement in the benefit-
contribution link alone will have only a marginal impact on coverage, if any, and as a
result increased coverage may come at a cost.  The arguments in favor  of increasing
coverage as well as some of the principal drawbacks are addressed below.
The main benefits from increased coverage under a multi-pillar pension scheme
arise in the following ways:
*  Formalized work relations promote better labor conditions, enforceable labor rights
and access to formal social risk management instruments besides pensions, such as
health, accident, sickness or  unemployment protection (Holzmann and  Jorgensen
1  999).
. Moving from the informal to the formal sector may effect economic growth.  If the
informal sector uses less productive technology with higher transaction costs, labor
force movement to the formal sector will enhance overall productivity and, in an
endogenous growth model, can lead to a higher growth path (Corsetti and Schmidt-
Hebbel 1994).
*  Expanded coverage and formal labor force participation will further strengthen the
overall revenue position of the government, which in turn may allow for additional
growth-supporting and poverty-reducing expenditures.
*  Partial pre-saving under a multi-pillar scheme should also better secure the provision
of future benefits.  Reliance on the multi-pillar allows households to diversify income
risk through foreign investments of pension fund resources.
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*> Expanded coverage under a multi-pillar scheme strengthens the secondary effects of
the move from an unfunded PAYGO to  a  system of funded pillars, including a
contribution  to national savings and financial market development.
*> Additional secondary  benefits presented in the literature include: an institutional shift
toward less reciprocal market arrangements that broadens household choice (Barr
1998);  greater  productivity  from  lifting  institutional  constraints  that  confine
households to  unproductive liquid investments (Alderman and Paxson 1992); and
economic growth from increasing access to savings and the efficiency of investment
through greater participation in the formal capital market (Serrano 1999).
The main barriers to  increasing coverage are linked with market imperfections
and the regime switch that a move from the informnal  to the formal sector implies. Design
improvements in the multi-pillar over the single-pillar PAYGO systems may have some,
but perhaps only  limited effects.  The main barriers are detailed in Section IV, and
include:
Imperfections in the output market.  In many countries access to the formal output
market  is  linked with  strict licensing regulation for the  producer of  goods  and
services. While strict regulation may be motivated by consumer protection, in many
cases license access is restricted by insiders and administrative  incapacity.
Imperfection and regulations on the factor markets.  On the labor market, heavy
regulation provides ample  incentives for  entrepreneurs to  keep  workers off  the
official payroll.  On the financial market, limited access to credits for consumers and
producers create another set of conditions rendering informal activities and non-
participation  in the mandated pension scheme rational.
The regime switch implied by a move to the formal sector. While workers may gain
access to a broader range of benefits, these typically imply high contribution rates for
the whole bundle of services, and payment, in principle, of all direct and indirect
taxes, related and unrelated to social security.
Last but not least, bad system design and/or administrative  weaknesses. The example
most often cited is  a  weak link between contributions and benefits that  renders
contributions akin to a wage tax that individuals will seek to avoid.
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An  expansion  of  coverage,  however,  is  not  cost-free.  As  mentioned  above,  even
an  actuarially  fair  system  provides  strong  rationale  for  individuals  to  stay  away  from
formal  social  security.  Hence,  attempts  to  force  increased  coverage  under  a multi-pillar
system  through  administrative  and  other  means  is likely  to imply  drawbacks:
Disregarding  the  argument  of  myopia  to  motivate  mandated  participation,  forcing
individuals  to  participate  in  a  (broadly  actuarially  fair)  pension  system  implies  the
imposition  of  a  savings  path  they  may  not  have  chosen  on  their  own.  In  a  world  of
perfect  capital  markets,  individuals  could  off-set  the  forced  saving  through  borrowing
(dis-saving).  In  a  not  so  perfect  world,  forced  savings  leads  to  individual  welfare
losses.
If individuals  consider  the  net-costs  of  forced  participation  to  be  too  high,  they  will
try  to  avoid  and  evade  the  mandated  contribution,  the  latter  typicality  by  moving  into
informal  sector  activities.  While  this  move  is  chosen  to  enhance  their  individual
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welfare, it is likely to have negative effects on the economy, including the choice of
lower production technology and higher transactions costs (including corruption).
The strategies for avoiding contributions  can be manifold.  Employees in sectors with
strong union representation will attempt to shift the burden to the employer, to the
detriment of the outsiders and employment.  In the case of low competition output
markets, the employer will try to shift the burden to the consumer. If self-employed
are not required to participate in the system or can more easily avoid the burden,
employees will notionally change to the self-employed status, which may weaken
their bargaining power and overall access to social programs.
Last, but  not  least, forced participation at  high individual costs may weaken an
existing informnal  safety net.  Workers that care for their parents (and children) in an
informal manner will have less resources to  share with them, which may increase
poverty among the current elderly not covered under formal provisions.
III.  Pension Reform and Coverage:  Illustrations from Chile and Argentina
Much of the literature on pension reform presents the single-pillar PAYGO model
as a manifestation of government failure.  Where the objective of governments has been
to  achieve greater  equity  through  a  redistribution of  income  within  and  between
generations, the State has often established mechanisms that not only fail to bring about
greater equity, but that also introduce distortions into the labor market that retard job
creation in the formal sector and lead to a loss of productivity. The increase in coverage
expected after the transition from an unfimded PAYGO system to a multi-pillar system
with funded individual  accounts is attributed to the correction of these distortions through
reform.  The labor market benefits of PAYGO-to-multi- pillar transition are widely held
to be (World Bank 1994):
the creation of a  stronger link between contributions and retirement benefits that
reduces the motivation to  evade by eliminating a perceived unrecoverable tax on
income;
a  reduction in  payroll taxes and  in the cost  of hiring incurred by formal-sector
employers;
greater flexibility and cross-sector mobility in the labor market enabled by portable
pension benefits; and
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reduction in incentives for early retirement and non-retention of experienced labor.
The simulations of the PAYGO-to-multi-pillar transition on which the incentive-
driven coverage  expansion  is  predicted  are  typically  performed  using  overlapping
generations (OLG) models with perfect foresight (see Auerbach and Kotlikoff 1987),
raising the question of why participation in formal pension systems should be mandated.
Publicly mandated pension systems are typically motivated by considerations of myopia
- the failure of individuals to  perceive future utility; insufficient or  lacking financial
market  instruments;  and  protection  of  public  resources  against  moral  hazard  and
opportunistic behavior.  The first two arguments imply that a mandated pension system
should replicate the saving behavior rational individuals would manifest if they had full
access to perfect market instruments. However, since it is difficult to design a collective
system that accommodates the preferences of all individuals, it follows that any mandated
scheme creates distortions and any contribution has a tax element, no matter how tightly
the contribution rate is linked with benefits. This suggests that - ceteris paribus - moving
to a multi-pillar scheme may reduce the tax element, but the effect is likely to be small
and hence have limited positive incentive effects on coverage.  If other obstacles and
institutional  barriers  remain  unchanged,  lower  coverage  may  even  result.  These
considerations seem to be validated in the case of the reformed systems in Latin America,
and are illustrated by the experience of Chile and Argentina.
Of the countries in Latin America that have reformed their public PAYGO plans
and established systems of defined contributions into individual accounts, only in Chile,
where payroll taxes fell from 19% to 13% (including commissions and the premium paid
for  disability coverage),  has  sufficient  time  elapsed  to  provide  relevant  empirical
evidence of such an adjustment.  Figure 3 shows a disaggregated picture of how non-
agricultural employment in Chile has evolved by sector from 1980 to 1997.
In Chile, where the AFP (Administradoras de Fondos de Pensiones) system of
funded individual accounts has been in  full operation for nearly nineteen years, that
portion of the workforce that is informally employed has increased from 49.9% in 1990
to 51.3% in 1997. This relatively static picture of the trends in sector choice supports the
assertion that the tighter link between contributions and benefits and the lower cost of
formal-sector hiring  brought  about by pension  reform may  be  a  necessary but  not
8Extending Coverage in Multi-Pillar Pension Systems
sufficient condition either for formalization of the factors of production or to  attract
widespread participation in  the new multi-pillar systems.  This  argument is  further
supported by studies of the Chilean labor market that conclude that the new pension
system has not caused significant changes in the number of workers, as a portion of total
employment,  who contribute  regularly to social security (Cortazar 1997).
On the other hand, the data in Figure 3 demonstrate that while informal sector
participation  has  risen  dramatically  in  other  Latin  American  countries,  sector
participation trends in Chile have remained relatively stable since the introduction of the
AFP system. Although there is insufficient  empirical evidence to support the claim that a
fully funded pension system of individual accounts will lead to a formalization of the
work force, pension reform in Chile may have played an important part in slowing the
growth of the informal sector (Schmidt-Hebbel 1998), but probably in concert with high
rates of economic  growth and employment  creation in the formal sector.
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While ILO  data on  sector participation are only  a  second-best indicator of
coverage of formal pension systems, the size of the informal sector is likely to be highly
correlated with the portion of the labor force that does not regularly contribute to a
9Extending Coverage in Multi-Pillar Pension Systems
retirement account.  Unlike the national PAYGO schemes that they replace, retirement
benefits in defined contribution systems are based on accumulated contributions and the
returns they earn from investment.  Under the reformed systems, regular contribution is
critical to adequate income replacement in retirement, making "coverage" a more active,
intentional concept than under the defined benefit framework and creating a group of
"partially covered" workers (James 1999).
I  i  L  S  |  11  1  1i  1  11  1|11  ~~~~~~~~i  I  I  ilii  .1i 
7axoo00  80
6000000  - -- :7J0  70
5000000  6.-  7000000D_
U.  -~~~~~~~~~~~~~50 
4000000~  ~  ~  ~  ~  ~  ~~~~)  4
cO30000D
30  3000000  ~  ~  ~  ~  ~  ~  30
20~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~1
0  0  ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~0  0
S9$ s9¢  149¢1  19i  149  N99  NJul-94  1994 1995 1996 1997  1998  May-99
Year  Year  After  Reform
*  A  OMfiates  _  Cbutors  --Cmtrs/Affdlates  A  Ofilates - Cortibutors  -- ContibutorslMfiiates
While worker affiliation to the AFP system in Chile may have increased since the
reform, the portion of affiliated workers who regularly contribute into their individual
accounts has actually fallen (Arenas de Mesa 1999; Mastragelo 1998). A similar, if more
accelerated, fall in the number of contributing affiliates has been seen in Argentina since
the  introduction of  its  private AFJP pension pillar. 3 Thus while the  percentage of
economically active workers considered "informal" may not exactly indicate the size of
3Readers  should  note  that the introduction  of the AFJP  pillar  in Argentina  in 1994  was followed  shortly  by
a deep recession brought on by the Tequila Crisis out of Mexico.  The steep fall in regular contributors is
likely explained by a rapid rise in unemployment,  which reached 18% in 1995.
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the  uncovered population, a  large and  dynamic  inforrnal sector facilitates irregular
contribution  patterns  by  providing  ample  opportunity  for  unregulated/uncovered
employment and easy exit and re-entry to formal-sector jobs  (World Bank 1999).  In
effect, a large infonnal economy transforms first- and second-pillar forced savings into
third-pillar investment choices.  Each individual and household is then faced with the
decision whether or not to participate  in the formal pension system, depending on the set
of viable alternatives to which they have access and the efficiency of each investment in
terms of reliability and returns.
IV. Barriers to Participation:  A Set of Hypotheses
This  section  sets  forth  a  number  of  hypotheses  as  to  why  rational
workers/households chose to avoid participating in multi-pillar pension systems.  The
hypotheses are grouped into five broad categories relating to: (i) the poor, (ii) the self
employed, (iii) transactions costs, (iv) system design issues, and (v) system credibility.
Each hypothesis is followed  by a short discussion and suggestions for further research.
The Poor
Pension systems funded through mandatory contributions can lead to welfare
losses for  households for  which rates of discount are high and credit constraints are
binding.
In most developing countries  a large segment of the population may simply be too
poor to participate in contributory pension systems.  Where household income may be
just enough to meet immediate, basic needs for survival, saving for old-age may not be
rational.  The rate of discount on future consumption of poorer households is relatively
higher than that of wealthier households. Poorer households will put much greater value
on consumption today than on consumption  tomorrow or far into the future. If the time
preference rate is  higher than the market rate  of  interest and credit is  expensive or
rationed, the shadow discount rate is even greater. 4 Thus, for lower income households,
mandatory contributions can lead to major welfare losses, and participation in a formal
4 The shadow discount rate for the poor can reach 10 and more percent in real terms p.a. even if the rate of
time preference is merely 4 percent and the  interest rate 2  percent.  For a  framework of distributive
considerations and numeric simulations  under market imperfections, see Holzmann, 1984  and 1990.
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pension system in  which savings are illiquid may place  an  intolerable constraint on
household efforts to smooth consumption.  Household data from Chile and Argentina
show a sharp rise in rates of participation in the formal pension system as income decile
rises from the poorest to the richest (Figure 5 and 6).
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In a related argument, income security in old age may not be the primary risk
concern of poor households.  The profile of risks faced by the poor may feature less
predictable shocks to  income such as disability and sudden illness more prominently.
This line of argument is strengthened by the link between income (nutrition/health)  and
mortality: i.e. poorer people would rather consume income today than save and consume
in the future when, because of their relatively higher mortality, they may not be around to
savor  deferred  consumption  in  retirement.  The  greater  priority  for  immediate
consumption is also explained by myopia - the failure to recognize fiture utility. 5
These factors combine to  augment the  implicit tax  component of  mandated
retirement savings for poorer households. To illustrate, assuming a market rate of return
of 5 percent in real terms and a subjective discount rate as typically estimated in the range
of  18 to  20 percent, then simple compounding of  contributions and discounting of
actuarially fair benefits lead to some 20 cents per dollar of contribution. Put differently,
the implicit tax share can be as high as 80 percent.
Traditional  systems of old-age security may still provide better risk management
for poorer households in developing economies.
There is ample evidence that poorer, economically active agents (as individuals,
as households, and within households) engage in consumption-smoothing  and exhibit risk
management in view of fluctuating income.  Where formal insurance markets have failed
to  coalesce or  may have broken  down due  to  moral  hazard and  adverse selection
stemming from information asymmetries,  the extended family and community have been
able to partially fill the gap.
The majority of the world's old people rely solely on informal and traditional
arrangements  for income security (World Bank 1994a). These traditional strategies can
take the form of larger families or preferences for male offspring in rural agricultural
economies and in labor markets that wage-discriminate  against women (Hoddinott 1992).
5 Much of the literature on time preference assumes that the rate of discount  is exogenous.  New theories of
endogenous  discount  rates  suggest  that  not  only  will  rates  of time  preference  fall as agents  gain in optimism
for the future  but also  that agents  play an active  part  in increasing  optimism  by pursuing  strategies  that  will
increase the likelihood of higher future utility - investing in future oriented capital (Becker and Mulligan
1997). In a related point, households are likelier to make investments  in such future oriented capital if they
have better information  about what they will need to maintain  (or increase)  welfare  when they can no
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Households may still depend heavily on reciprocal relationships within tribe  or extended
family; remittances arising from rural-to-urban and international migration of household
members (Hoddinott 1992; Lucas & Stark 1985); strategic marriage arrangements (Stark
1995); intra household  arrangements; the establishment of  a portfolio of assets with
uncorrelated risks (Stark 1990); the purchase of livestock or jewelry; the forward sale of
agricultural crops; and community  based credit schemes.
The  portfolio  of  strategies taken  by  risk-averse households will  necessarily
depend on the relative costs and benefits of each, and their efficiency in balancing returns
with risk (Holzmann and Jorgensen 1999).  A portfolio of informal assets may have
higher returns  (own  education or  education of  a  child)  and  lower  risks  (beholden
children) than those afforded by formal pensions.  Formal pension systems based on
compulsory  savings  may  impose  liquidity  constraints  on  households  pursuing
informal/traditional arrangements for  retirement security,  thereby crowding out  such
arrangements.  Furthermore, "coverage" offered under the formal pension system may
not substitute for investment in informal arrangements that are often multi-functional
(covering risks other than old-age poverty) and flexible to a worker's (the household's)
particular need.
The transition costs of moving from  informal to formal  regimes of retirement
security are too high.
Just as the transition from an unfunded PAYGO system to a funded multi-pillar
can impose a double burden on a "transition generation" of workers, the move out of a
regime of informal strategies into a formal pensions system may also impose high costs.
Workers informally supporting an  elderly parent - and who may have held credible
expectations that  their  children would provide similar  support when  grown - upon
moving into a formal system, would be expected to continue their support in addition to
funding their own retirement.  Similarly, opting for the formal system may brand  a
worker/household as  untrusting or  disdainful  of  "traditional  ways".  Once  branded
untrustworthy the worker/household may be  locked out  of reciprocal systems of risk
longer work. Recent research shows that myopia can be decreased if workers are given an estimate of their
income needs in retirement (Mitchell 1999).
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management, leaving them dangerously vulnerable to shocks other than the inability to
work in old age.
The Self Employed
Contributory  pension systems impose constraints on productive investments of the
informally self-employed
The constraints  imposed  by  formal  pension  systems  on  the  self  employed
(especially the poor self employed) are more binding on their investments in productive
inputs than on their ability to smooth consumption. The rate of interest on borrowing for
investment in small enterprise can be very high - even infinite - while the net marginal
returns to a unit of capital invested in small enterprise may be considerably higher than
the retums from investing the same unit of capital in an AFP account.  Avoidance of the
formal pension system may be optimal given capital and credit constraints on productive
investment choices of  the self employed and the opportunity costs of vesting scarce
capital in an illiquid retirement account.
Where formal  retirement  security  is  bundled  with  unrelated  government
regulations and taxes, the costs of compliance may be too high.
Coverage under a formal pension system is often nested deeply within the broader
regulatory framework of the formal economy. Participation may require compliance with
regulations and labor standards unrelated to the provision of income security in old-age.
How retirement contributions are collected can also impose  secondary costs.
While there are recognized efficiency gains from collecting contributions together with
other taxes, where collection is centralized the self-employed (and employers in small
firms) will find it difficult to  divorce their participation in  the pension system from
overall compliance with a tax code they may continue to perceive as unjust (Schwarz
1998).  Pension contributions, even if perfectly liked to benefits, are then perceived by
association as another tax to evade.  Participation in the pension system can, therefore,
invite constraints on the rational, individually utility-maximizing behavior of informal
economic agents (De Soto 1989; Tokman 1992).  There is a likely trade off between
fiscal efficiency from  linking  contribution collection to  collection of taxes  and  the
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incentives to  participate.  The more the  State relies on pension systems to  increase
collection of unrelated taxes and enforce labor regulations, the deeper it will cut into
incentives to participate.
Moreover, a fixed contribution rate and the inability to draw on their saved funds
in times of hardship may place unacceptable constraints on the self  employed whose
incomes are episodic and whose financial needs are less predictable.  This is especially
true of farmers and rural non-farm self-employed whose wealth is held in illiquid forms
(accruals in  farming capital and "on the hoof',  but little cash) and whose income is
largely seasonal.  An AFP account might be more attractive to  agents with irregular
incomes if they were allowed to  use their retirement balances as collateral to  borrow
and/or withdraw a limited amount in case of emergencies, with penalties for failure to
replace the withdrawn amount after a specified period.
Self  employment  may attract  individuals  who prefer  to  bear  a greater  share  of
old-age  income risk than to rely on government  mandated pension  systems.
There may be a high degree of self selection into informal self employment.  The
self- employed may prefer to bear a larger share of retirement income risk and take a
more active role in managing their long term savings and investments. They may even be
relatively less myopic than wage/salaried workers. Research should examine whether the
self employed as a group take greater precautions for retirement security by analyzing the
past labor market status/sector choice (salaried or self employment) among the current
elderly not receiving pension benefits (past evaders).
A casual poll of taxi drivers in Santiago and Buenos Aires reveals that at least
some self employed are pursuing alternative market strategies for retirement security,
investing in financial sector instruments other than the second pillar retirement accounts.
In Chile, term life insurance policies (seguro de vida con ahorro), available since 1995,
seem to  offer a  competitive alternative investment. 6 Private insurance companies in
6  Similar to policies offered in the US, the seguro  de vida con ahorro in Chile offers an attractive
insurance/savings  option.  Santander's  policy, Super  Futuro, guarantees  a market  rate of return on the
savings  portion  that will not fall below  UF+4%.  Policy  holders can insure up to a certain amount in
benefits in case of death without having to undergo medical examination. Partial withdrawals can be made
from the savings account after 3 years of paying premia.  At the legal age of retirement, the policy holder
can withdrawal the full balance in his/her savings.  Although premia are taxed, the returns to the savings
account and withdrawals are tax  exempt (conventionally, TEE).  A close study of the profile of policy
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Chile report that, while it is likely that the policies are prohibitive for poorer households,
there is considerable demand for these life insurance/savings facilities among middle-
and lower-income groups,  especially younger age cohorts for whom premiums are low.
System Transactions  Costs
The  cost  of pension fund  administration cuts  into account balances, lowers
returns and increases the implicit tax on participation.
There is a mutually  reinforcing vicious cycle between low rates of participation in
the new multi-pillar pension systems and their high administrative costs.  The fewer the
workers who affiliate and regularly contribute to the system, the harder it is for the fund
managers to lower costs by exploiting economies of scale.  If costs to the workers remain
high, the returns from the system will be low relative to the returns that can be earned
from other formal and informal retirement investments, making the opportunity costs of
participation  prohibitive for poorer households.
A large body of literature has been written on the commissions and fees charged
by second-pillar fund managers and whether these commissions are high relative to the
fees charged by similar agents - banks and mutual fund managers - in developing capital
markets.  These costs are  especially high  for  poorer households and  workers who
frequently enter and exit the formal labor force (Srinivas and Yermo 1999).  The prices
exacted by the AFP mangers in Chile's second pillar have been blamed for increasing the
perceived tax component of retirement contributions (Torche and Wagner 1997) and
encouraging evasion.
Valdes-Prieto (1998) finds that in Chile, while AFP commissions are lower than
those charged by mutual funds, the charges on an AFP retirement savings accounts are
60% greater than those on a regular savings deposit in a private bank.  Other researchers
contend that charging commissions as a percentage of wages is cheaper over the course
of the  workers'  contributing life than  commissions as  a  percentage of  earnings or
buyers  in Chile  should  be considered,  since  the features  of the life  insurance  with savings  policies  resemble
funded defined benefitideferred  annuity plans.  The self-employed may be demonstrating a preference for
pension plans with an absolute return guarantee over the  relative return guarantee offered by the AFP
system. Alternatively, they may simply value the access, however limited, to a portion of their savings.
Allowing  workers  to withdraw  a portion  of their savings  could imply very low balances  at the time of
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accumulated balance.  A branch of this research suggests that AFP commissions are
competitive, especially when the additional educational services that the pension fund
managers provide to their affiliates are considered.  The level of commissions and fees
may be justified  when the value of the "financial education" received by the average
affiliate - who may have no other contact with the formal financial sector - is taken into
full account.  This is a claim that still needs to be investigated.
The transaction costs of providing financial services to the working poor are too
high to attract the interest offund managers, eliminating incentives to affiliate rural and
urban informal sector workers.
Where a market for private management of pension savings has developed, the
high costs of providing financial services to contributors with lower and more irregular
incomes may deter fund managers from affiliating informal sector workers. The costs of
collecting contributions from often mobile workers and of reporting to informal affiliates
the balances  in  their  individual accounts may be  high  when  compared  to  the  low
commissions (as a percentage of wages) that the fund managers can earn.  Furthermore,
providing savings facilities to workers with lower surplus incomes involves diseconomies
of scale.  Disincentives to the AFPs are compounded in the case of informal workers in
rural areas where transactions costs are even greater due to population dispersion and
information  asymmetries.
However, much has been learned in  the last twenty years  from the practical
experience of  community-based organizations (CBOs)  and  micro-finance institutions
(MFIs) that have developed methodologies to dramatically reduce the costs of providing
financial services to the working poor.  MFI's have experimented with different ways of
structuring financial contracts and with developing supervision mechanisms that reduce
information asymmetries and consequent costs.  Emerging evidence reveals a demand
among the working poor for formal savings facilities (Alderman and Paxson 1992; CGAP
1997). In Bolivia, organizations like BancoSol (formerly PRODEM) are already offering
medium and long term savings accounts to their clients as well as positive returns to
shareholders.
retirement. Evidence from Singapore suggests that workers are likely to exhaust their retirement savings if
access is permintted.
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While most MFIs lack the capacity to invest workers' savings, there is still an
important role they can play.  The greatest costs to AFPs from affiliating the urban and
rural poor arise from  contribution collection and  disclosure of  account information.
These are services in which the MFIs pose an institutional comparative advantage. There
should be room for trade in financial services between AFPs and MFIs.
Structural Factors
The benefit structure of minimum  pension guarantees introduces  deterrents to the
participation ofpoorer households  as well as  perverse incentives  and moral hazard.
Minimum pensions guaranteed by the government are often blamed for being
both deterrents to participation and the source of moral hazard.  A poverty trap may be
created when poorer households that do not expect to qualify for the formal minimum
pension guarantee decide not to  participate.  The minimum guarantee can also create
incentives  for  workers to  participate only  until  they  have  complied  with  vesting
requirements and to evade thereafter.
In the Chilean AFP system the government guarantees a minimum pension to
affiliates who have contributed for  at least  20 years.  In  Argentina, workers must
contribute to the system for 30 years before qualifying for the state-guaranteed minimum
pension.  There is evidence in both Chile and Argentina of strategic under reporting of
wages by workers - especially the self  employed - who may be  seeking only the
government-guaranteed  minimum. The barrier to participation posed by discrete vesting
requirements could be removed by applying both vesting and the guaranteed benefit
continuously. For examnple,  a worker that contributes to Argentina's reformned  system for
only 25 and not the required 30 years would receive some benefit proportional to his/her
years of contribution instead of receiving  no benefit at all.
The strongest motivation to regularly contribute to a second-pillar retirement
account is not income security in old age, but rather to gain access to health insurance
and better health care.
Surveys of the informally employed show a greater demand for formal health
insurance above all other forms of insurance including retirement (ILO  1997).  The
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greater demand for health coverage is not surprising since the returns from a worker's
investment in health insurance are usually enjoyed over his/her lifetime, while those from
formal social security and pensions are only enjoyed in old age.  All other things equal,
the tighter access to health coverage (or disability) is bundled together with the pension
system, the more attractive regular participation will be.
Although the self-employed in Chile are excused from participation in the pension
system, many informally self-employed who are otherwise neither regulated nor directly
taxed contribute to an AFP in order to gain access to health insurance (both to FONASA,
Chile's  state health  insurance scheme,  and  to  the  ISAPRES,  the  country's  private
providers).  There are even reports of workers contributing to an AFP for a determined
period in order to secure access to health care when they need it most, such as during a
pregnancy.  In Argentina, health insurance was separated from the privately managed
pension system, and is still financed through pay-roll taxes to  union-organized group
policies called "obras  sociales",  however, access to health insurance and care is just as
tightly linked to participation in the reformed pension system as it is in Chile.
Where employers are required to pay  a larger payroll  contribution relative to
workers, the employer will have more to lose (gain)  from participation (evasion) than the
worker will have to gain (lose).
With the introduction of the multi-pillar model, employer contributions are often retained
to finance government liabilities from the old regime, and/or first-pillar benefits, while
workers'  contributions are left to  accumulate in a  second-pillar account.  While the
worker's contribution to the second pillar may no longer be perceived as a pure tax, the
employer's contribution to the first pillar on the worker's behalf may be.
The ratio of  employer to  worker contributions  can influence the  decision to
participate or to evade.  High employer contributions relative to the contributions of
workers provide the employer with a greater incentive to evade and to informalize  his/her
workers.  Even if the worker fully perceives future utility (is "clairvoyant")  and would
like to benefit from participating in the formal system, the decision to contribute may not
be his/hers to make.
A shift in the employer/worker split can correspond to a shift in the bargaining
position (and  threat  points)  of  each  in  negotiating terms  of  employment, including
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whether  the  contract  will  be  formal  or  informal.  The  extent  to  which  the
employer/worker  contribution split will effect the decision to participate (to comply) will
be  determined  by  the  elasticity  of  labor  supply  (affected  by  range  of  informal
employment opportunities) and the existence (and importance) of institutions (such as
unions, labor codes) that prevent employers from shifting the entire burden of payroll
taxes onto the worker by reducing net wages. 7 If the employer does not coerce evasion
outright, he/she may collude with the worker to avoid the costs of participating by adding
a portion of would be retirement contributions to the workers' take-home pay (Schwarz,
1998).  All  other  things equal,  a  higher  ratio  of  employer/worker contributions is
expected  to lead to lower participation in the formal system.
The establishment of  a  specialized private pension fund  industry  to manage
mandated worker savings can discourage competition and slow a downward adjustment
in commissions.
Observers suggest that the regulatory framework for the new second-pillars, while
designed to protect affiliates, often creates biases against competition, efficiency, and
specialization.  The PAYGO-fully funded reforms in Latin America often "...confer  a
collective monopoly of managing mandated savings..."  to  the new fund management
industry, excluding other financial intermediaries from  competition for affiliates, and
limiting market forces that in time would lower second-pillar costs 8 (Shah  1997).  In
Argentina, there is growing concern that recent market consolidation will further hurt
competition, and as the AFJPs increase their efficiency and cut their costs, these savings
are not being passed on to affiliates. 9
aRecent  findings from labor market analysis in Brazil would complement the "contribution split/bargaining
position" hypothesis.  Gill 1998 finds that since labor market institutions favor the worker and strengthen
their bargaining position in negotiating the terms of the contract, workers in the formal and the informal
sector are able to take employers to court to demand coverage under any of Brazil's social security and
unemployment insurance programs.
s While the creation of a  special pension-fund industry might be justified in the  first few years after a
reform, and  it is certainly prudent to build fire walls  between workers'  savings and  fragile fnancial
institutions, over time these precautions should not be  allowed protect an entrenched AFP market from
outside competition.
9The  SAFJP has  noted that as  the price of  disability and  survivors  insurance premiums falls, AFJP
commissions have remained steady since the inception of the system in 1994.
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Current regulation of pension fund  investment causes distortions, limits returns
and restricts workers' choices, making participation less attractive relative to market
alternatives.
The regulation of the market structure and investment decisions of second-pillar
fund  managers  has  been described  as  "draconian"  (Vittas  1996).  Although  strict
regulations may be justified to safeguard workers' retirement savings from the risks of
developing capital markets in the first few years after a pension reform, they impose
significant costs over time.  Analysis of pension fund investment performance in Chile,
Argentina and Peru, has shown that restrictions on investments (especially on investment
in equity and foreign issues) create distortions in asset management, limit opportunities
for diversification, and constrain workers' choices as the funds in these countries are
earning almost the same rates of return (Srinivas and Yermo 1999).
The investment choices of account holders are further constrained by the limit of
one pension fund per fund  administrator. In most countries that have adopted the multi-
pillar pension model, the investment of a worker's savings is restricted to a single fund
that is invested mostly in government bonds.10 This restriction makes it impossible for
workers to shift the risk/return profile of their investment in the second-pillar account
from a more aggressive holding when they are still young and risk-tolerant/return-hungry
to more conservative  fare as they become older and more risk averse (Shah 1997).
The financing  of  the  transition  toward  multi-pillar and/or  the  new  benefit
structure make participation  for some  participants less attractive.
Moving from single-pillar PAYGO to  a multi-pillar system imposes a  double
burden on transition generations if the implicit debt made explicit is repaid and the
reform does not create sufficient extemalities (such as lower labor market distortions or
growth effects from financial market development),  which can be used to repay this debt
(Holzmann 1998). Since these extemalities take time to materialize, transitory budgetary
financing will lead to an increased tax burden for the working population, with the size
and  effects depending on the  form of taxation (labor, income or consumption tax).
10  In Mexico  a second  fund,  primarily  of equity  holdings,  is contemplated  in the 1995  reform  legislation  but
has yet to be implemented.
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However, in many cases the additional taxation will lead to incentives to avoid or evade
formnal  labor market participation.
The negative participation and hence coverage effects on certain groups of the
working population, particularly the poor, will be enhanced if the new benefit structure
provides a lower rate of return. Not everybody under the old PAYGO system received a
low (implicit) rate of return - the rate was sometimes high for the poor, due to high
minimum pensions and low eligibility requirements, and individuals with  very steep
earnings profiles and pensions calculated  on last years earnings only.
Credibility of Reformed Systems
Households  may put little stock in the promises of government. Reformed  pension
systems may be suffering  from  an inherited lack of credibility associated with formal
pensions institutions.
Workers'/households' idiosyncratic rates  of time  preference are to  an  extent
determined by their individual preference/tolerance for risk.  Under a public PAYGO
system, risk to the worker is defined by his/her failure to receive the promised pension.
Even if workers were fully aware of the implicit guarantees in the benefits defined by
social security legislation, they might have perceived a  high  political risk to  their
promised pension stemming directly from a government's  lack of credibility.  If the
government had a track record of frequently changing the "rules of the game" (vesting
requirements, the benefit formula or minimum pension guarantees); if the inflation tax
was high; and  if  funds earmarked to  pay  retirement benefits  were mismanaged or
depleted, workers might have considered the risk of not receiving a PAYGO pension too
high, and thus may have heavily discounted the returns to being covered. The high risk
of not receiving the defined benefit, coupled with high transactions costs of compliance
or  costs  (in  other  taxes)  of participating in  the  formal economy, may  have  fully
eliminated returns to participation in the system.
Both real and perceived political risk is a difficult and enduring legacy that may
inevitably color workers' perceptions of any government mandated retirement security
program. Post-reform, the political risk to the new system perceived by workers may still
be high, even if reforming governments have attempted to start with a clean slate by
23Extending Coverage in Multi-Pillar Pension Systems
establishing new private pensions institutions and new public authorities  to regulate them.
Workers may not put stock in the reform of a government that has frequently changed
vesting and benefit rules in the past.
Households may  find the burden offinancial risk in the post-reform systems to be
too high.  Exposure to capital market investment may (positively or negatively) influence
the decision to participate or to evade.
A criticism of defined contribution systems is that they require workers to assume
too  much risk  to their income  security in retirement.  While  under public  PAYGO
regimes government assumed a hefty share of risk (longevity and financial risk), under
the reformed systems workers are often burdened with the full weight of risk.  1l  Although
these risks stem from many sources (systemic, demographic and financial) and can be
minimized in a variety of ways, we are concerned with  how workers will behave -
whether they  will chose to  participate in the  new system,  or not - when  suddenly
confronted by a new set of financial risks shortly after a reform.
Under a fully funded system of individual accounts, risk is defined by greater
certainty of receiving some pension but uncertainty as to the level of the pension, or of an
accumulated balance sufficient to guarantee an adequate stream of income in retirement.
However, the premise that  workers'  decision to  participate is  somehow affected by
systemic or financial risks (real or perceived), rests on the assumption that workers have
information on the workings of the financial sector or have had the opportunity to build
expectations of  these  workings,  either  through  participation  in  the  form  of  own-
investments or through the participation of a close friend or family member (learning by
observing). To the extent that workers have previously (i) held financial assets, including
a  bank account with time-deposits, and/or (ii) have relatives who have held financial
assets, the premise is stronger.12
If, on the other hand, workers have had no previous contact with the financial
sector and no experience of the earnings and loses that can be made on the capital market
How risk to retirement income security is diversified post-reform varies from country to countiy.  In
Chile, Mexico, Peru and El Salvador, a greater share of financial risk is borne by the worker.  In Argentina,
Uruguay, Colombia and Bolivia, a large portion of risk is retained in the tax-financed pillar.
12 The "learning by observing/by doing" hypothesis presents additional motivation for an investigation of
workers' economic and financial awareness.
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- if as is often the case, workers are paid in cash and do not even have a bank account -
they  may  not  even have  a  bench-mark  perception  of  the  risks  and  returns  from
participating in the new system.  Systemic and financial risks would not enter into the
rational worker's perceptions and decision-making.  These workers may even  fail to
perceive  the  elimination  of  the  pure  tax  component  of  mandatory  retirement
contributions.
Workers may be uncomfortable with the  "privatization of social security",  and
have little  faith in the  profit motives of the private sector.
While the credibility of the government and that of the publicly managed pension
system may not have been high in  the past, the  credibility of the  new private  fund
managers in the funded pillar may not be much higher.  This may reflect a simple lack of
information or familiarity with the financial sector; mistrust in the profit motives of the
capitalist system and its visible representatives - the financial market institutions; or a
negative past experience with unregulated or government related financial system, i.e.
"crony capitalism".
The  fist  two  obstacles  to  greater  credibility  can  be  partially  overcome  by
increased disclosure and education, while the last requires structural and political changes
in the pension system as well as the financial sector.  In Eastern Europe and Central Asia
where  disclosure is minimal, information about  financial markets  is scarce, and  the
impact of recent economic shocks has been widely felt, governments have established
publicly  administered "accumulation  funds"  alongside  the  new  privately  managed
pension funds to ease the transition.  Any measure aimed at increasing the credibility of a
privately managed system, however, requires time for its impact to be felt.
The list of hypotheses presented in this section is by no means exhaustive. Rather
than  providing a  single explanation as to  why  workers/households choose to  evade
participation in multi-pillar pension systems, the discussion suggests that the roots of the
coverage problem are multiple and intertwined.
V.  Preliminary Econometric Evidence from Chile and Argentina
In this section we discuss the results of exploratory econometric tests performed
on data from the 1996 CASEN in Chile and the 1997 EDS in Argentina.  In order to
25Extending Coverage in Multi-Pillar Pension Systems
substantiate the prior Section,  we have attempted to test as many of the hypotheses as the
available data will permit.  The tabulated results  of our analysis as well  as a fuller
discussion of the data employed, and its limitations, is provided in Annex I.  Readers are
cautioned from the onset that the surveys chosen are not uniform in breadth or depth, and
thus the results presented in this section cannot be compared.  Further, the results are
preliminary and are intended primarily to illustrate the need for sharply focussed data
collection and further research.
Methodology and choice of variables
We have chosen a simple methodology to test several of the hypotheses outlined
in Section IV - the estimation of probits on participation to the formal pension system.
This method evaluates the significance, positive or negative impact that a number of
explicative variables have on the probability that a working age individual will contribute
to the formal (AFP or any) pension system.
The variables included in the probits were selected with an eye to the hypotheses
in Section IV and the richness of each database.  We do not claim that our selection is
either exclusive or exhaustive.  A number of alternative variables to those chosen could
have been used to test the hypotheses - whether traditional social security strategies act
as substitutes to the formal system, for example (gender rather than simply number of
children, or contribution  to the household of resident elderly rather than their number). In
several instances we were obliged to  construct imperfect, proxy variables to test our
hypotheses; to  illustrate, we  used  a  targeted  housing  benefit  to  measure  liquidity
constraint.
We grouped the variables into sets according to the hypotheses being tested.  The
first set  of variables reports on  the impact of the  individual characteristics (gender,
marital status, age category, and  educational attainment).  This  last variable has the
additional benefit of acting as an instrument for income.'3 A second set of variables test
whether the demographic and geographic characteristics of the household (number of
children  and  number  of  elderly  residing  in  the  household  and  dummy  variables
accounting for region and urban/rural location) affect the probability of  contributing
13  In fact, while  education  is highly  correlated  with individuals'  incomes,  its correlation  with  other  variables
is typically  smaller  than that  for  income.
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toward  a  pension.  The  third  set,  welfare  variables,  includes  both  individual and
household characteristics: the former refer to the contribution to health systems, while the
latter to the existence of students receiving private education in the household.
For  the  probits  on  data  from  Chile,  the  set  of  variables  capturing  labor
characteristics includes a composite index of labor status: this index starts at 0, for those
out  of  the labor market,  and rises with  the  unemployed, and  increasing degrees of
formality. Formality is defined over two main parameters: the existence of a contract and
the time tenure of the job (permanent vs. temporary/occasional). In addition, we include
dummy  variables  isolating  the  self-employed  in  three  key  sectors:  agriculture,
manufactures and services. The inclusion of these dummies simultaneously tests whether
self-employment is in itself a decisive variable on contributions to AFPs and how that
impact varies across sectors.  Finally, we explore the role of  incomes accruing from
sources other than labor and access to credit using two dummies.
To  the  extent  possible,  we  used  variables  in  our  estimates  for  Argentina
equivalent to those for Chile.  We included individual and household characteristics,
constructed a similar informality index, and used a housing-finance subsidy to proxy for
credit constraint.  To accommodate asymmetries in the chosen surveys, we used a single
variable for contribution to the health system.  Furthermore, we placed greater emphasis
on reported secondary  jobs in order to capture the influence of secondary employment -
and in particular secondary self employment - on a worker's decision to contribute to a
pension system in Argentina.
The Determinants of Pension Participation in Chile (see Table Al  in Annex 1)
The results from the probits for Chile show few surprises. As education rises, so
does the probability of contributing to  an AFP  account (or to  any  pension regime).
Hence, not only are larger stocks of human capital a determinant of participation, but
ultimately higher income level increases the probability of regular contribution.  Women
are less likely to contribute than men, and even less so if they are married.  However, in
general, married individuals tend to participate more.  We attribute these phenomena to
differentials in labor participation: women, and married women in particular, participate
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much less in the labor market than do men.'4 Consequently, they are less exposed to the
government's mandate to contribute to the pension system.
The relationship between age and likelihood of contribution does not follow a
linear trend, as anticipated.  However, our results suggest that as individuals age over
forty, the probability that they will contribute to an AFP decreases with respect to the
control group (those 15-29 in 1996).'5  Although this is understandable for age groups
near or beyond the retirement age, it is counterintuitive for the 40-49 age group.  Note
that the counterintuitive result disappears when we consider contributions to any pension
system.
As expected, household demographics affect the probability of contribution both
to AFP and other systems. Each additional child a family has lowers the likelihood that
individuals in that household will contribute. However, the reverse holds for the number
of elderly in  the household.  This result may indicate that more children reduce time
supplied to the labor market as a result of childcare responsibilities, while the presence of
elderly relatives, who may fulfill this function, increases the number hours working age
household members will sell.  Note that the test on the specification of the number of
children indicates a linear specification: it might be that older siblings are not given the
responsibility of caring for younger siblings, or more likely, that even if they are, this
does not significantly effect the labor supply decision.
Living in Greater Santiago increases the likelihood of contributing to AFP but
does not increase the likelihood of contribution  to the other pension schemes, while living
in rural areas decreases that probability.  This result supports the hypothesis that the
transactions costs that usually accompany  the provision of financial services in rural areas
may be dissuading the AFP supply and worker demand alike.  There also appears to be a
clear  link  between  AFP participation and  contribution to  the  health  system.  The
likelihood of contributing to the pension system increases as we move from the indigent
and the poor up the income ladder to the less poor.  Enrollment in an ISAPRE increases
the probability of  AFP  contribution (and  pension  contribution generally) the  most.
14 This is true in Chile and across Latin America.
15 Note that individuals in the 15-29 group in 1996 are the only group that was not yet in the labor market at
the time of the 1981 reform.  This group constitutes the only workers who did not choose between the old
PAYGO and the new AFP system.
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Interestingly, those who purchase more exclusive health insurance are less  likely to
contribute.
The most significant variable in our exercise is a worker's degree of formality (as
defined previously).  As  formality increases,  it  is  more  likely  that  the  individual
participates  in  the  AFP  system.  Typically informal  occupations  such  as  the  self-
employed exhibit decreasing probability to contribute to an AFP, this being especially
true in the agricultural and manufacturing sectors.  The critical factor that is most likely
driving this result in Chile is that the self-employed are not required to participate in the
pension system.  The result reflects the lower rates of  contribution shown in  earlier
descriptive statistics.  However, that the only group of workers that are not forced to
participate largely chooses to participate less than salaried workers could be used as
evidence to  support a  number of  hypotheses: that  agents are myopic;  that superior,
alternative strategies of minimizing income risk in  retirement prevail; or that the self
employed are less myopic and pursuing alternative strategies more suitable to their needs.
The Determinants of Pension Participation in Argentina (see Table A2 in Annex 1)
Once again, readers must use caution in interpreting the results of our estimates.
The construction of the key variable, contribution to the pension  system, in the EDS
introduces a structural bias into the model.  Since only private sector wage employees are
asked whether they contribute to the pension system, all other occupation categories are
automatically classified as non-contributors.  Furthermore, some of the  data used  to
construct the variables included in the Chilean estimate are unavailable in the EDS data
base.  A further bias in the results arises from the urban sample frame employed in the
EDS.  As demonstrated from the estimates using data from Chile, the determinants of
participation in the pension system have a significant rural/urban dimension.
These caveats not-withstanding, the results in Argentina, as was the case in Chile,
show  few  surprises.  Education  has  a  positive  and  significant  sign.  Individual
characteristics all have the predicted signs and  are significant, except for the  gender
category.  As  age increases, we observe increases in the probability of contribution,
except, of course, for those in the retirement age, 65 and older.  Household demographic
variables also behave as predicted.  The linear specification of the number of children in
the household is preferable to non-linear specifications: the sign on the variable is both
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negative and significant.  In Argentina, as well as in Chile, a large number of children
may be  substituting for  formal social  security, while the  number of  elderly in  the
household raises the probability of contribution.
Geographically, living in the province of  Buenos Aires, as  opposed to  other
regions, has no noticeable impact on contribution. This is interesting as, to a large extent,
Argentina and  Chile are geographically comparable: a big  metropolis for capital and
extremely distant  regions.  However,  the  metropolitan  region in  Chile  was  found
significant even for the all-pension regime probit estimation.  Whether information or
infrastructure costs play an important role is difficult to gauge as we have no infornation
on rural areas.
As in the Chilean estimate, degree offormality is the most significant determinant
in  our  estimates, even when, due  to  the  limitations  of the  EDS questionnaire, the
formality index in Argentina leaves out a critical variable, the "nature of labor contract".
As  explained  earlier,  self-employment  dramatically  decreases  the  probability  of
observing pensions contributions, reflecting the bias  in the EDS questionnaire.  More
interestingly, having a second occupation in addition to salaried employment (secondary
self-employment) does not reduce the probability of contribution, but rather, increases it.
This result contradicts the fundamental assumption implicit construction of the EDS
questionnaire, namely: individuals in activities other than salaried employment do not
contribute to formal social security.
Finally, contributions for health are again strongly associated with contribution
toward pensions, probably reflecting the tight link between Argentina's obras sociales
and the Integrated PAP/AFJP system.  The educational welfare variables and access to
credit variables (the latter, also a proxy: subsidized housing finance, as in Chile) were
found not to be significant.
Preliminary Conclusions
The exploratory econometric exercise has many (data) limitations, and this strongly
supports the call for development of a specialized data set to permit better discrimination
between altemative and complementary hypotheses for non-participation in a multi-pillar
pension system. Still, despite its limitations, the exercise strongly supports the conjecture
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that individual/family circumstances matter for participation in a formal pension scheme,
and most parameter estimates are consistent with the underlying hypotheses, in particular:
*> The lower participation of the poor/less educated in a mandated pension scheme;
*> The special situation of the self-employed - although the currently available data do
not allow us to distinguish between the effects of credit constraints or differences in
risk-taking behavior;
*> The effect of household composition on participation and the potential influence of
informal/traditional  retirement strategies;
*> The interaction between the pension system and access to other social programs, most
importantly health coverage.
To confirm these results, to distinguish between competing explanations, and equally
important to  test other hypotheses such as the impact of transaction costs and  system
design, more and different data is required.
VI. Ongoing and Future Research
This  section  describes  ongoing  research  on  the  barriers  to  participation in
reformed pension systems.  These efforts include a comparative study linking coverage
under the reformed pension systems of Chile and Argentina and social risk m'  anagement,
and an evaluation of coverage expansion policies in other Latin American countries that
have reformed social security.
Comparison of  Coverage and Household Social Risk  Management in  Chile  and
Argentina
Although this paper makes a first attempt at explicative analysis for low rates of
participation  in  reformed  pension  systems  in  Chile  and  Argentina,  the  depth  of
investigation is  severely constrained  by  limitations  of  the  data  currently  available.
However,  the  contrasting  political  and  economic environments  under  which  social
security reform was undertaken, the varying depth of reforms, and the differences in the
formal pensions  institutions  that  were  adopted  in  Chile  and  Argentina provide  an
excellent opportunity for rich, comparative analysis.  A comparative approach to  the
study of coverage and household social risk management will allow for the isolation of
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the impact of important structural differences between the two reformed pension systems
on the decision to participate (as hypothesized above).
Of particular  importance to  the  examination of  household  participation and
coverage will be: (i) contrasts in the role of government in each of the reformed systems;
(ii)  the  structure of  government guarantees; (iii)  financing  of  transition  costs;  (iv)
centralized versus  decentralized  collection  systems;  and  (v)  treatment  of  the  self-
employed under the two regimes - voluntary versus compulsory participation in the
reformed systems - and the effect mandated participation has had, if any, on the extent of
coverage.' 6 A Social Risk Management Survey (SRMS) - focussed on risks to income in
old-age, and combining  elements of  labor, household, consumption and  expenditure
surveys - will be  conducted  in  Chile  and  Argentina to  gather data  on  household
awareness  of  the  reformed  systems, preferences  for  alternative  retirement  security
investments, financial literacy, access to credit, perceptions of mortality and contingent
risk-coping strategies (See Annex 2 for outline of survey structure).
Table 1.  Features of Reformed Pension Systems that May Influence the Decision to Participate -
Nature of Reform  Public defined benefit  (PAYGO) changed  Separate regimes consolidated. Public split
to private defined contribution (all workers)  into public PAYGO and private defined-
contribution
What happens to the old system?  Phased out  Continues with changes
Is second-pillar mandatory for new  Yes  No, workers have a one-off choice of
labor force entrants?  participating in PAYGO or AFJP system
Treatment of self employed  Voluntary  Obligatory
Structure of public pillar  Minimum Pension Guarantee (MPG)  Flat and minimum pension
Social Assistance
Financing acquired rights under old  Recognition bonds financed with future  Compensatory pensions financed partially
PAYGO  general taxation  through current pay-roll taxes
Total contribution rate for new
system...
- for old age annuity  10  8
- disability/survivors/commissions  3  3
- public pillar and social assistance  General Revenues  16|
Total contribution rate
before  reform  19  27
after reform  13  27
,  employer/worker  0/13  16/11
employer contribution is pure PAYGO
taxation, for the universal flat benefit
16  To  illustrate,  to  the  extent  that  the  self-employed  affiliate  voluntarily  with  a  Chilean  AFP,  the
significance  of  income  level,  occupation,  and  a number  of  household  factors  on the decision  to participate
can be examined.
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Collection  of contributions  Decentralized:  Employers  pay  to fund  Centralized:  Employers/workers  pay
managers,  with  follow-up  enforcement  by  contributions,  along  with  taxes  on income
regulator  and other  tribute,  to single  tax authority
(DGI)
2Id Pillar  commission  structure  fixed: although  variable  on contributions,  on  Variable:  on contributions,  discounts  for
combination.  no discounts  length  of period  affiliatedlcontributing  to
l  ____________________________  A  FJP
Maximum  percentage  of portfolio
allowed  in....
,  Domestic  equities  30  63
Foreign  securities  12  17
Gov't  securities  50  65
(in 1994)
Second  pillar  contributors  as % of  57%  48%
affiliates
The Effectiveness of Government  Interventions to Increase Coverage
Several governments that have adopted the multi-pillar pension framework have
included special features and mechanisms in their reforms to  "graduate" workers into
regularly contributing to a second-pillar account.  The efficiency of these programs has
yet to be formally assessed or their impact on coverage to be measured.  Some of the
programs that should be evaluated include:
*  The Social Quota in Mexico:  Private sector workers in Mexico began to affiliate
with  pension  fund  managers in  February  1997.  By  December  1997, most
privately-employed formal sector workers  (96%) formerly covered under  the
public  PAYGO  system had  elected  a  private  fund  manager  to  invest  their
retirement savings.  Partly as an incentive for workers to affiliate with the new
system, the government deposits Pesos $1 per day into the retirement accounts of
contributors, indexed to  the  consumer price  level  (CPI) and  estimated to  be
between 1 and 5.5 percent of worker salary, depending on the workers' incomes.
On average, the Social Quota will be equivalent to 2.2 percent of wages (Cerda
and Grandolini 1998).  The pension authorities have yet to report on the impact
the Social Quota has had in terms of new affiliates to the formal pension system.
*  Second-Pillar account  subsidies  in  Colombia:  Colombia  introduced  a  new
pension system of privately managed accounts in  1994.  The government has
experimented with  a  targeted program  that  subsidizes  contributions  into the
second-pillar retirement accounts for informal sector workers.  The subsidy is
meant to integrate the informally employed into the formal system.  Formal sector
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workers earning more than four minimum wages contribute an additional one
percent of their income that, along with matching transfers from the government,
makes up a publicly managed Solidarity Fund.  Revenue from this fund is used to
subsidize the participation of lower-income  workers.  However, the subsidy is not
universal to poorer workers but targeted to certain areas (Queisser 1998)
*  Subsidized second-pillar participation in Uruguay:  In Uruguay, participation in
each pillar of the reforned  pension system is determined by a worker's level of
income.  Authorities have reported a rise in participation in the national pension
system since the government undertook a structural reform of social security in
1996. The Uruguayan government attributes this rise not only to the correction of
perverse incentives that prevailed under the old PAYGO scheme, but also to the
option afforded to workers whose income falls below a certain threshold' 7 to split
their  pension  contributions  between the  remaining  PAYGO  pillar  and  their
individual retirement accounts.  To encourage the participation of lower-income
workers, reform legislation allows workers earning less than five-thousand pesos
per month to contribute up to half of their mandatory 7.5% PAYG contribution
(3.75%) into an individual retirement account.  The government absorbs this loss
of revenue to the first-pillar as an explicit subsidy.
An evaluation of each specific intervention, along with an overview of policies
applied to increase social security coverage in developed economies, would form a core
of "best practice" that currently does not exist.
VII.  Conclusion
This  paper provides a  set of  preliminary hypotheses to  explain low  rates of
participation in reformed social security systems, with special emphasis on reforms in
two Latin American countries, and their implications.  The hypotheses claim that the
working poor and  self-employed continue to have a  specific and strong rationale for
avoiding participation in the multi-pillar pension system and that high transactions costs,
systemic and design issues, and problems of credibility negatively influence the decision
to participate on the part of all members in the labor force.
'7 Workers earning the average wage in  Uruguay can qualify for the contribution split.
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Some  of  the  established  hypotheses  have  been  subjected  to  exploratory
econometric testing  using available household  survey data  for  Chile and  Argentina.
While the available data do not allow all of the hypotheses that have been discussed to be
tested, or  an  empirical discrimination among them, they support the conjecture that
socioeconomic characteristics matter  for  (non)  participation, and  that  the  poor,  the
uneducated and the self-employed pose a special challenge to the extension of pensions
coverage.  In addition to a more social security-focussed survey, comparative analysis is
required to confirm the results presented in this paper and to test those hypotheses related
to the different pensions institutions reforming governments have chosen to put in place.
Work in this vein has already begun.
An important underlying implication of the hypotheses presented is that rather
than any fundamental flaw in the multi-pillar pension framework, reforms have not gone
far enough toward making formal retirement security portable, flexible and inexpensive,
and that there is still plenty of scope for a second wave of structural adjustmnents  to
reformed retirement security systems.  While these reforms may not lead to full coverage
of the labor force, they should ease the problem of inadequate retirement income for an
important share  of  the  population, reduce  the  scope and  need  for  non-contributory
assistance, and provide important social and economic benefits beyond income security
in old-age.
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VIII.  Annex 1: Empirical  Analysis  of Available  Household  Data  from Chile  and
Argentina
In this Annex  we: (i) describe  the selected  survey  data from  Chile  and Argentina  and  discuss  its limitations;
(ii) and  present  the results  of tests  of as many of the hypotheses  outlined  in Section  IV as the available  data
will permnit.
A.  Data Description and Data Limitations
From the array  of household  and labor surveys  conducted  in Chile and Argentina,  we selected  the 1996
CASEN  and  the 1997  EDS  for our analysis.' These  two surveys  provide  the latest  available  information  in
each country  required  for our investigation,  namely:  (i) data on participation  in the government  mandated
pension  system,  and (ii) data on socioeconomic  characteristics  of individuals  and households  (education,
occupation,  and incomes)  necessary  to identify  the factors  that determine  participation  in formal social
security.
Our empirical  work  was seriously  constrained  by limitations  in the data. First, neither  of the surveys  that
were chosen  have  pensions  or social  insurance  as their primary  or secondary  focus. Rather,  the surveys  are
intended  to assess  the accessibility,  coverage  and targeting  of social assistance  programs.2  Second,  and
more  importantly,  the surveys  are not  uniform  in breadth  or depth,  and thus the results  cannot  be compared.
While  the Chilean  survey  reports  on the affiliation  and contribution  to social  security  of all individuals  in
the active labor  force  regardless  of sector (private  or public)  and occupation  status (employees,  employer,
self-employed),  in Argentina  only private  sector employees  are asked whether  or not they contribute  to a
pension system (i.e., Whether  contributions  are deducted  from their salaries for retirement schemes).
Furtherrnore,  in Chile  the CASEN  specifies  to which  regime  (AFP,  SSS, CAPREDENA,  etc.) within  the
social  security  system  a worker  is affiliated  and  regularly  contributes,  while in  Argentina  the particular  plan
to which  a worker  contributes  (AFJP,  PAP)  is not specified.
While  the responses  of the self employed  in Chile  reveal  important  information  on the demand  for  public
pensions  and the motivations  to contribute,  the failure of the EDS (as well as of Argentina's  Encuesta
Permanente de  Hogares - EPH) to question the self employed on their participation  in government
mandated  social security  is particularly  surprising  since  the self employed  are required  to contribute  in
Argentina.  This  omission  in the data from  Argentina  not only  ignores  a critical  and  frequently  unprotected
sector  of the economy,  but introduces  a serious  structural  bias  to our results.
B. Methodology and Results
We propose  a simple  methodology  to test the hypotheses  outlined  in Section  IV  - the estimation  of probits
on participation  in the formal  pension  system  (defined  via  regular contribution).  This  method  evaluates  the
significance,  positive  or negative  influence,  and impact  that a number  of explicative  variables  have  on the
probability  that  a specific  event  will be observed.  For our purposes,  the event  is specified  as contribution  to
the (AFP or any) pension  system  by individuals  in their working age.  While the available  data allow
differentiation  between  analysis of participation  in the funded versus  the PAYGO  systems  in Chile for
which  two probits  are estimated,  the dependent  variable  for our probit on Argentina  is "contribution  to a
pension  system".
The main  results  are presented  in Table  Al (Chile)  and Table  A2 (Argentina).
'Social Development  Survey  (Encuesta  de Desarrollo  Social),  1997  EDS  and the National  Socioeconomic
Characterization  Survey  (Encuesta  de Caracterizacion  Socieconomica  Nacional),  1996  CASEN.
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Table  Al:  Chile  - Results  from Probits  on CASEN  1996  Data
DEPENDENT  VARIABLE  CONTRIBUTION  CONTRBUTION
TO  AFP  TOWAR  ANY  PENSIONSYSTEMI
C;000t0;"00i  t:00 00  'oefcient40  z-value0  Easticity  Coefficient  z.waueA  0000-Elasticity  flmeanl(x)
INDIVIDUAL  CHARACTERISTICS
Years  of  School  0.0031  2.25*  0.039  0.0069  4.88  0.076  7.35
Female  Dummy  -0.05  -2.67  -0.043  -0.064  -3.37  -0.051  0.512
Marital  Status
Single  reference
Manied  0.221  11.01  0.214  0.276  13.72  0.239  0.568
Manied  Female  Dummy  -0.561  -20.63  -0.271  -0.665  -23.85  -0.291  0.28
Age  groups:
15-29  reference
30-39  0.109  6.44  0.04  0.15  8.6  0.049  0.218
40-49  -0.109  -5.37  -0.026  0.092  4.5  0.022  0.156
50-59  -0.384  -15.02  -0.073  -0.004  "-0.17  -0.0007  0.112
60-65  -0.781  -16.58  -0.074  -0.241  -5.78  -0.021  0.056
65PLUS  -1.189  -17.32  -0.196  -0.602  -12.22  -0.09  0.097
HOUSEHOLD  CHARACTERISTICS
Number  of children  -0.012  ^-2.1  -0.024  -0.03  -5.21  -0.056  1.2
Number  of aged  0.05  4.12  0.04  0.028  *2.36  0.021  0.48
Santiago  dummy  0.039  2.57  0.015  0.036  *2.26  0.012  0.233
Rural  dummy  -0.056  -3.43  -0.025  -0.092  -5.48  -0.037  0.263
WELFARE  VARIABLES
Contributions  to Health  System
Public  system
Fonasa  categories  A,B  reference
Fonasa  categones  C,D  0.587  35.18  0.18  0.548  32.61  0.151  0.179
Pnvate  Systems
ISAPRES  0.808  45.83  0.232  0.655  36.39  0.17  0.169
Otherprivatesystems  -0.48  -17.81  -0.098  -0.694  -24.62  -0.129  0.121
Private  educaton  household  -0.038  "-1.69  -0.005  -0.017  "-0.443  -0.0013  0.081
Dummy
LABOR  CHARACTERISTICS
LabourStatus(formalityindex)  0.443  123.55  1.719  0.484  114.15  1.711  2.29
Agrcultural  self  employed  dummy  -0.193  -4.99  -0.012  -0.074  ^-2.26  -0.004  0.038
Manufacture  self  employed  Dummy  -0.763  -6.832  -0.013  -0.661  -6.39  -0.011  0.01
Service  self  employed  dummy  0.216  ^2.01  0.0008  "0.95  0.105  0.002
FINANCIAL  VARIABLES
Financial  inoome  household  Dummy  -0.063  -4.27  -0.013  -0.034  ^-2.282  -0.004  0.532
Public  Housing  Credit  Access  Dummy  0.011  "0.02  0.001  0.097  3.71  0.01  0.07
CONSTANT  -2.136  -89.53  -2.15  -85.51
Number  of  Observations  95337  26845.9  95337  24364.1(23)
(23)
Wald  Chi2  (n-d.freedom)
Log-Likelihood  -23521.1  -22244.1
Test  on  linearity  of  number
of children:
Chi2(1)  0.67  1.62
Prob>Chi2  0.412  0.203
'indcates  vaiable  Ls nt sgnigicant  an  the  99%.  cunhlderce,  but  is  significant  up  to  95%
inncates  vaiabe  is signeficant  at  confidence  levets  lower  than  95%
Wald  statist  tests  Sie  signricance  of  te nnodel.
The-  null  fpotesis  on  the  test  for  hneat  of number  of  children',  is  the inear  secificaton.
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Table  A2:  Argentina  - Results  from  Probits  on EDS  1997  Data
DEPENDENr  VARIABLE :  CONTRIWUTIONS  TOA  PENSION  SYSTEM
Coelfcient  zvabe  elastict  . Mean(x)
INDMDUAL  CHARACTERISTICS
Years  of  School  0.021  2.51  0.467  10.22
Female  Dummy  -0.098  "-1.23  -0.107  0.492
Marital  Status
Single  Reference
Married  0.974  8.62  0.309  0.141
Married  Female  Dummy  -1.019  -6.86  -0.018  0.081
Age  groups:
15-29  Reference
30-39  0.648  3.95  0.042  0.029
40-49  1.239  8.54  0.061  0.022
50-59  0.861  6.1  0.058  0.03
60-65  0.633  3.04  0.011  0.009
65PLUS  -1.302  -4.66  -0.035  0.012
HOUSEHOLD  CHARACTERISTICS
Number  of  children  -0.139  -4.21  -0.291  0.93
Number  of  aged  0.136  *2.24  0.061  0.201
Buenos  Aires  dummy  0.061  0.99  0.063  0.46
WELFARE  VARIABLES
Contributions  to  Health  System  Dummy  0.478  6.9  0.198  0.187
Private  educaton  household  dummy  -0.034  "-0.391  -0.020  0.256
LABOR  CHARACTERISTICS
Labour  Status  (formality  index)  0.365  25.59  0.892  1.115
Workers  with  secondary  occupations  other  than  waged,  0.703  2.08  0.002  0.001
dummy
Self  employed  dummy  -3.002  -10.07  -0.262  0.039
FINANCIAL  VARIABLES
Financial  income  household  dummy  n.a  -0.126  -0.029  0.105
Public  Housing  Credit  Access  dummy  .- 1.33
CONSTANT  -2.371  -22.34
Number  of  Observations  14045
Wald  Chi2(n-dfreedom)  1276.7  (18)
Log-Likelihood  -2645.7
Pseudo-R2  0.438
Test  on  linearity  of  number  of  children:
Chi2(1)  0.61
Prob>Chi2  0.435
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Annex 2: Overview of SRMS/PRIESO Questionnaire  - Chile
In this Annex we provide an  overall description of the  Social Risk Management Survey - SRMS (in
Spanish: Encuesta  de Prevision  de Riesgos  Sociales  - PRIESO)  being piloted in Santiago, Chile in the Fall
of 1999.  The SRMS combines elements of labor, household, consumption and expenditure surveys and
additionally will gather data on household awareness of the  reformed pension system, preferences for
alternative retirement security investments, financial literacy, access to credit, perceptions of mortality and
contingent risk-coping strategies.  The survey is intended to overcome the limitations of currently available
household data, and has the following objectives and design:
(i)  The SRMS is structured to identify and evaluate the strategies taken by individuals - and by
groups of individuals in the household - in the face of a series of risks to income.  The survey emphasizes
those risks that affect the individual, and by extension his/her household.  The questionnaire explores both
institutional strategies as well as  informal or traditional strategies taken by  households in the face of
income risks arising from the inability to work in old age, disability, work accident, and the death of
income earning spouse.
(ii)  The principal  focus  of  the  survey  is  on  the  Chilean  Pension  System, specifically  on  the
motivations of working-age individuals when they decide to contribute or not to contribute to an individual
retirement account.  Following a set of introductory questions in Module I meant to identify characteristics
of  individuals and the composition of the household to which they belong, Module II of the SRMS, Risk
Recall and  Perception,  constructs a  history of  past and  present  shocks to  income  and  measures the
expectation of future risks that can influence the decision to undertake risk-minimizing strategies.  Module
III, Evaluation  of the Pension  System,  examines the knowledge and attitudes toward the pension system of
both covered (contributing)  and non-covered workers.
(iii)  The remaining three modules seek to map the set of alternative strategies to participation in the
formal social security system.  These alternative strategies have been divided into three broad categories:
Financial  Strategies  (Module IV), strategies that rely on Intra  and  Inter Household  relationships (Module
V), and fnally, strategies related to the Labor  Market  (Module VI).  The survey seeks to identify, evaluate
and quantify: (i) the relevance of inter- and intra-household transfers to the decision to participate in the
formal pension system; (ii) access to credit and personal savings - either complementary to or substitute for
an AFP account; and (iii) variations in the household's supply of labor as a counter-cyclical risk-coping
mechanism.  At the end of Module V, a series of questions are asked to measure respondents' economic
and financial awareness. These questions cover knowledge of basic economic indicators like the inflation
rate and the rate of unemployment, as well as more sophisticated indicators such as the level of the stock
market index.  The data arising from these questions will allow researchers to test the  extent to which
economic and financial awareness differs between contributing and non-contributing workers.
(iv)  The SRMS will be  conducted on a sample of 2,500 respondents of working age (14 years and
older) from the Santiago Metropolitan Area (including peripheral rural areas), drawn from the  sample
frame of the 1998 CASEN. Relative weights will be assigned to maintain statistical representation by labor
market  status  (employed/unemployed),  occupation  (dependent  worker/employer/self  employed),  sex
(male/female) and  location (urban/rural).  The selection of  the  respondent in each  household will be
random, and unrelated to that individuals relation to the household head.
(v)  The full questionnaire is available on the worldwide web at http://www.worldbank  org/sp  and
readers are encouraged to review the survey, in English or  in Spanish, and to provide comments to the
authors. First results are expected to become available in spring 2000.
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Summary  Findings
The paper provides a set of preliminary hypotheses  and exploratory
econometric testing  to explain low rates  of participation in reformed social
security systems,  with special emphasis  on two Latin  American countries.
The  hypotheses  claim that the working poor and self-employed  continue to
have a specific and strong rationale  for avoiding participation in the multi-
pillar pension system  and that transactions  costs,  system  design  issues,  and
problems of credibility  negatively  influence the decision of all members  of
the labor force to participate. Some  of the established  hypotheses  have
been subjected  to exploratory  econometric  testing  using  available  household
survey  data for Chile and Argentina. The results  support  the conjecture that
socioeconomic characteristics  matter  for (non) participation, and that the
poor, the uneducated  and the self-employed  pose  a special challenge  to the
extension of pensions  coverage. The paper outlines a research  strategy,
including a more social security-focussed  survey  and comparative  analyses,
to confirm the results  presented in this paper, and to test those hypotheses
related  to the different pensions institutions reforming governments  have
chosen  to put in place. Work in this vein has already  begun.
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